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The Patriation and Quebec Veto 
References: The Supreme Court 
Wrestles with the Political Part of the 
Constitution 
Peter H. Russell* 
I. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S ROLE IN  
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
Several times in Canada’s history the turbulent waters of constitu-
tional politics have roared up to the Supreme Court, when for a moment 
the political gladiators in a constitutional struggle put down their armour, 
don legal robes and submit their claims to the country’s highest court. 
September 1981 was surely such a moment.  
Indeed, it is difficult to find any other constitutional democracy 
whose highest court has been called upon to render such a crucial 
decision in the midst of a mega constitutional struggle over the future of 
the country. The U.S. Supreme Court in Dred Scott1 may be the closest 
example. The German Constitutional Court rendered important decisions 
in the reunification process and in relation to the European Union.2 But 
these decisions did not have as direct a bearing on the political conflict of 
constitutional change as the 1981 Patriation Reference,3 or indeed the 
Quebec Veto Reference4 that followed a year later. And I might add to 
                                                                                                             
*  Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Principal of Senior College at the University 
of Toronto. 
1  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). See Don E. Fehrenbacher, Slavery, Law and 
Politics: The Dred Scott Case in Historical Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
2  See Peter E. Quint, The Imperfect Union: Constitutional Structures of German Reunifica-
tion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
3  Reference re Amendment of Constitution of Canada, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 
S.C.R. 753 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Patriation Reference”]. 
4  Reference re Amendment of Canadian Constitution, [1982] S.C.J. No. 101, [1982] 2 
S.C.R. 793 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Quebec Veto Reference”]. 
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these extraordinary incidents of the Supreme Court of Canada’s constitu-
tional statecraft, the Quebec Secession Reference of 1998.5 
For better or worse, Canada, more than any other constitutional de-
mocracy in the world, has called upon its highest court to adjudicate 
disputes of fundamental importance to its very existence. 
II. A TECHNOLOGICAL FARCE 
An indication of the importance of the Patriation Reference to the 
body politic is that the Supreme Court decided it would deliver its 
decision to the country on live television, the newest communications 
technology of the day. And what a farce that turned out to be! 
On the morning of September 28, 1981, as the nine justices filed 
through the door to take their places at the long table facing the court-
room, Justice William McIntyre, then the junior member of the Court so 
the last in line, caught his shoe on the wire carrying the television sound 
system. Justice McIntyre had no idea what he had done. Nor did his 
Chief Justice, Bora Laskin, who at 10:30 a.m. precisely began reading 
summaries of the majority and minority opinions. Millions of viewers 
watched the Chief Justice solemnly mouthing the words. There was no 
sound. If this was disconcerting to the television audience, it was much 
more than that for the three members of the CBC colour commentary 
crew consisting of Dan Soberman (Dean of Law at Queen’s), CBC 
reporter Peter Mansbridge and myself. We were downright panic-
stricken. For when Justice Laskin was finished, it was our job to explain 
to Canadians — in a nutshell — the meaning of the Supreme Court’s 
decision. With no written text available to us, what were we to say?  
A great Canadian communicator saved our bacon. Mike Duffy, then a 
CBC television reporter, had managed, nimble as that rotund fellow is, to 
climb up on a chair and get his ear up against a sound amplifier. On the 
proverbial back of an envelope Duffy scribbled what he took to be the 
main points: a green light on law for the federal government but a red 
light on convention. When Duffy’s bit of paper was handed to us by our 
producer, Arnold Amber, the three of us had just a minute or two to 
decide whether we should go with Duffy or ask for a break to read the 
text. We decided to go with Duffy and, luckily for us, he had nailed the 
decision: legally the federal government could ask the U.K. Parliament to 
                                                                                                             
5  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Quebec Secession Reference”]. 
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patriate the Constitution with only two provinces’ consent, but if they did 
so they would be violating a convention of the Constitution. Thank you 
Michael Duffy — you well deserve your appointment to the Senate! 
This was the first and last time the Supreme Court endeavoured to 
release a decision on live television. That is the technological legacy of 
the Patriation Reference.  
III. A JURISPRUDENTIAL LANDMARK 
But, much more significantly, the Court’s decision in the Patriation 
Reference is a jurisprudential landmark decision, not only for Canada but 
also for the common law world, on the part of our Constitution referred 
to as constitutional conventions. Since there was no written constitutional 
text on the requirements for a Canadian request to the U.K. Parliament to 
amend Canada’s Constitution, if the Court agreed to answer the questions 
posed in the reference, it could not avoid dealing with arguments based 
on unwritten constitutional convention. In doing so, Canada’s Supreme 
Court provided the most extensive consideration of constitutional 
conventions ever rendered by the high court of a country whose institu-
tions are based on British constitutional culture.  
In terms of legal theory, fundamental metaphysical or ontological 
questions were in play: What is convention? What is law? Is convention 
part of the law of the Constitution? It is not surprising that the Court 
stumbled in handling these questions. The Canadian justices’ intellectual 
formation — like that of the vast majority of lawyers — has little room 
for such profound philosophical questions. 
All nine judges considered that law and convention are separate 
things. For the three dissenting justices (Laskin C.J.C., Estey and 
McIntyre JJ.), that was reason enough for the Court not to consider 
arguments about conventions. “It is not the function of the Court,” they 
said, “to go beyond legal determinations.”6 However, these three decided 
to ignore their own logic and deal with the constitutional convention 
question anyway. They did so simply because the other judges had 
decided to answer questions about constitutional convention and they did 
not want to be left out of the game. 
The majority on convention (Beetz, Chouinard, Dickson, Lamer, 
Martland and Ritchie JJ.), citing numerous cases in which courts have 
used convention to interpret formal legal powers and have given legal 
                                                                                                             
6  Patriation Reference, supra, note 3, at 849. 
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effect to conventions, held that a question about convention was justicia-
ble. I agree with the majority, but think its position would have been 
more coherent, and intellectually more respectable, if instead of saying as 
they did, “constitutional conventions plus constitutional law equal the 
total constitution of the country”,7 they had followed A.V. Dicey, who 
introduced the concept of convention to distinguish two sets of constitu-
tional rules — one set that he referred to as laws “in the strictest sense” 
and another, which although it formed “a portion of constitutional law”, 
he called convention.8 
What makes it difficult for many lawyers and legally trained scholars, 
and indeed the three dissenting Supreme Court justices, to accept that 
questions about constitutional questions can be justiciable is the sharp line 
they draw between law and politics. Here I think they err by being attached 
to too narrow a view of politics. Aristotle held that what distinguishes 
human societies from the societies of inanimate nature is their capacity to 
conduct their affairs through a discourse about justice rather than through 
the play of brute force or instinct. In this sense it is man’s distinctive nature 
to be “a political animal”, and a discourse about justice is fundamental to 
politics. Law and adjudication are fundamentally about justice. That is 
why we say courts administer justice. Of course, there are other aspects of 
politics than exchanging views about justice. But it is wrong to let these 
other aspects — particularly the contest for power among competing 
politicians — blind us to politics in the Aristotelian sense. Law is the 
specialized sphere of the political realm where we aim to deal with 
questions of justice in a manner that is insulated from the rough and 
tumble aspects of politics.9 But law and the work of courts should never be 
treated as outside of politics. Following Dicey, we should understand 
conventions to be the part of our constitutional law that is shaped by 
politicians acting in response to their times and circumstances, and does 
not depend on the courts for its enforcement.  
The majority did a better job in clarifying the role of constitutional 
conventions in our system of government. They captured well the 
essence of Dicey’s conception with the following words: 
                                                                                                             
7  Id., at 883-84. 
8  A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: Macmillan, 
1959), at 24 [hereinafter “Dicey”]. For my full argument on this point, see Peter Russell, “The 
Supreme Court Decision: Bold Statescraft Based on Questionable Jurisprudence”, in Peter Russell, 
Robert Décary et al., The Court and the Constitution: Comments on the Supreme Court Reference on 
Constitutional Amendment (Kingston: Queen’s University Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 
1982) 1-32. 
9  See Peter H. Russell, “The Politics of Law” (1991) 11 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 127. 
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The main purpose of constitutional conventions is to ensure that the 
legal framework of the constitution will be operated in accordance with 
the prevailing constitutional values or principles of the period.10 
To use Dicey’s language, conventions are “a body of constitutional 
or legal ethics” concerning the proper use of legal powers.11  
It is on the question of how to identify a constitutional convention 
that the Supreme Court may have made its most important contribution 
to constitutional theory. They did this by adopting the test set out by  
the constitutional historian, Sir Ivor Jennings, in The Law and the 
Constitution:12  
We have to ask ourselves three questions: first, what are the precedents; 
secondly, did the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound 
by a rule; and thirdly, is there a reason for the rule? A single precedent 
with a good reason may be enough to establish the rule. A whole string 
of precedents without such a reason will be of no avail, unless it is 
perfectly certain that the persons concerned regarded them as bound  
by it.13 
In essence, the Jennings test makes the existence of a constitutional 
convention depend on (1) whether there is a good principle of govern-
ment for the rule; and (2) whether the key actors in the situation (who 
will be political leaders or government officials) feel ethically bound to 
abide by the rule. Admittedly this two-fold test is not easy to apply. It 
requires conscientious, responsible thinking about the core principles of 
our system of government. And it requires a consensus among elected 
political leaders. That, indeed, is the inherent democratic component of 
constitutional conventions. They are made and unmade in the arena of 
politics.  
In Canada in recent years we have witnessed a breakdown of that nec-
essary political consensus on conventions that is fundamental to the 
operation of parliamentary democracy. The majority’s discussion of 
constitutional conventions is a useful guide to what is needed if we are to 
avoid conflict and possible crises in operating our parliamentary system in 
the future.14 It is particularly helpful in pushing those who debate and 
                                                                                                             
10  Patriation Reference, supra, note 3, at 880. 
11  Dicey, supra, note 8, at 417. 
12  W. Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed. (London: University of London 
Press, 1959), at 136. 
13  Patriation Reference, supra, note 3, at 888. 
14  See Peter H. Russell, “The Need for Agreement on Fundamental Conventions of Parlia-
mentary Democracy” (2009-2010) 27 N.J.C.L. 201.  
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discuss constitutional conventions to appreciate that ascertaining what 
constitutional convention requires is not simply a matter of searching  
for precedents.  
IV. A SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION OF THE MAJORITY’S TEST 
The majority on convention, applying Jennings’ test, found that “the 
agreement of the provinces of Canada, no views being expressed as to its 
quantification, is constitutionally required” as a matter of convention for 
the passing of the Parliament of Canada’s address to the U.K. Parliament 
requesting the changes to the Constitution incorporated in the proposed 
package of patriation amendments.15 
This ruling was successful in satisfying both of the key requirements 
of the Jennings test. First, this rule was justified by the federal principle 
that is fundamental to the very nature of Canada and its constitutional 
structure. Second, not only did the precedents indicate the need for 
provincial consent for such amendments, but the actors currently in-
volved in operating this part of our constitutional system — the Prime 
Minister of Canada and the provincial premiers — demonstrated by their 
actions that they felt bound by this rule. 
For an hour or so after the Court’s decision was rendered, it was not 
entirely clear that the Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, did feel bound by 
the rule. He was in Seoul, South Korea at the time. When the Supreme 
Court’s decision reached Cabinet Secretary Michael Pitfield, who was 
travelling with the Prime Minister, it was the middle of the night in Seoul 
and Pitfield decided not to wake Trudeau up. While Trudeau slept in 
Korea, in Canada, we in the media heard that his Justice Minister, Jean 
Chrétien, was roaring around his department threatening to act on the 
legal green light the Court had given his government and ignore its red 
light on convention.  
It was surely a good thing for the integrity of our federation that 
Prime Minister Trudeau, once he had a chance to digest the Court’s 
decision, did not hesitate to say that he would have to meet with the 
provincial premiers to make the changes in the proposed constitutional 
amendments necessary to increase substantially the level of provincial 
support for them.  
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V. THE QUEBEC VETO REFERENCE — A QUESTIONABLE 
APPLICATION OF THE TEST 
Within a year and two months of deciding the Patriation Reference, 
the Supreme Court was called upon, in very different circumstances, to 
make its second decision on constitutional convention, the Quebec Veto 
Reference.16 The altered circumstances had much to do with the Court’s 
decision in the previous year.  
In early November 1981, Prime Minister Trudeau and the premiers 
of all the provinces except Quebec reached an accord on the terms of 
patriation. Three weeks later the Quebec National Assembly passed a 
resolution objecting to making these changes in Canada’s Constitution 
without Quebec’s consent. At the same time, the government of Quebec 
referred to the Quebec Court of Appeal the question whether proceeding 
with these amendments without Quebec’s consent was “unconstitutional 
in the conventional sense”. This did not stop the Canadian government 
from proceeding with patriation on the terms agreed to with the other 
provinces, nor the U.K. Parliament from passing the Canada Act, 198217 
implementing the requested amendments. On April 7, 1982, the Quebec 
Court of Appeal brought down its decision, holding unanimously that as 
a matter of constitutional convention, Quebec’s consent was not re-
quired.18 On April 13, 1982, the Quebec Court of Appeal’s decision was 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. Four days later the changes to 
which Quebec objected were proclaimed in force by Queen Elizabeth II.  
Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada in dealing with this case was 
truly between a rock and a hard place. If, applying the Jennings test, it 
found that the Quebec Court was wrong, it would render patriation, much 
celebrated outside of Quebec, unconstitutional. Even if the finding was 
based on convention, it would be extremely embarrassing to the federal 
government and the other provinces. Given the precedent of a year 
earlier, it would be difficult for Trudeau to say he could ignore conven-
tion. If, on the other hand, the Court upheld the decision below, it seemed 
that it would have to deny the principle that Quebec, as the home of one 
of Canada’s founding peoples, is not a province like the rest, and should 
not have its powers or place in Confederation altered without the consent 
                                                                                                             
16  Supra, note 4. 
17  (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
18  Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General) (1982), 134 D.L.R. (3d) 719 
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of its government. In the face of Canadian history going back to Confed-
eration, that is not an easy principle to deny. 
So what did the Court do? Well, the same nine justices who had de-
cided the Patriation Reference on December 6, 1982 unanimously held 
that as a matter of convention Quebec did not have a veto over constitu-
tional amendments affecting its power and status.19 They did this by 
tiptoeing around the question of principle and applying only Jennings’ 
rule that the actors involved must feel bound by the convention. There 
was no tangible, documentary evidence demonstrating that the Prime 
Minister of Canada and the premiers of the other provinces had in the 
past felt bound by a rule that required Quebec’s consent. And certainly 
the behaviour of these actors in the present, in going ahead with the 
patriation package of amendments without Quebec’s consent, demon-
strated that they did not feel bound to recognize a Quebec veto. So, with 
a negative finding on one of Jennings’ two tests, they thought they could 
avoid the embarrassment of dealing with the principle at issue. 
This decision has had a most unfortunate legacy for Canada. Mr. 
Trudeau and the nine premiers who supported him, by proceeding 
without Quebec, broke the bond of trust between French and English 
Canada that lies at the heart of Confederation. In doing so, they took a 
roll of the die that would make even Brian Mulroney blush. The gamble 
came very close to misfiring on the night of October 30, 1995, when 
Quebeckers came within 31,000 votes of registering a referendum vote 
for independence. In giving judicial protection to the political actors who 
effected patriation, the Supreme Court, in my view, did not administer 
justice.  
The politics of Canada’s federal union, reinforced by Jean Chrétien’s 
1996 Constitutional Amendments Act,20 have now settled the matter: in 
convention and in statute law, the Quebec veto exists. It is my fervent 
hope that the bond of trust that was broken in 1982 will eventually  
be restored. 
                                                                                                             
19  Quebec Veto Reference, supra, note 4. 
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